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DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

NIO/GPF

S-file DIPP

Long Range
Defense Intelligence
Projections for Planning

Ground Forces
U.S.S.R. (U)

MARCH 1982

NOFORN/NOINT/NOCONTRACT

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DIA review completed.

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Methodology

General

(U) The technique used in preparing the LRDIPP is to utilize the best available documentary intelligence and the best available expertise in arriving at a firm estimative position and then, as appropriate, to describe or bound the limits of uncertainty inherent in the projections. Force level figures reflect midyear estimates.

Line Entries

(U) New as well as postulated weapon systems are included in force projections when the chances are at least even that they will be deployed. When a weapon system is an important, feasible, but unlikely addition to Soviet forces during the 10-20 year projection period, the system is described in only general terms.

Expressions of Probability

(U) While we recognize that the LRDIPP contains various types of uncertainty, we have, as a practical matter, used one basic method for expressing uncertainty--percentage statements of probability and their related verbal descriptors. These percentage statements (e.g., "80 percent chance") are provided at the point at which an important judgment is made in the text. In order to avoid a profusion of probability levels that would unjustifiably give an impression of precision, we have limited the percentages generally used to multiples of 10.

Key Judgments

(S) The Soviet ground forces of the 1990s will be a product of Soviet threat perception and desire to maintain sufficient combat power to sustain their influence in the world. Economic developments and, to a lesser extent, demographic trends will also influence future ground forces. We believe that growth and modernization will continue during the '90s. We estimate that the number of active ground force maneuver divisions will grow to a level approaching 201-3 during the '90s. The Soviets may add 8-10 mobilization bases to their ground forces during this period.

(S) We project that Soviet forces opposite NATO will continue to enjoy high priority for new weapons systems while the number of divisions will remain stable at the peak reached